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Competition Advocacy: Time For A
Rethink?

Simon J. Evenett*
Abstract: This paper examines the conventional wisdom concerning
competition advocacy, paying particular attention to the applicability of
such wisdom to developing countries. The definition of competition
advocacy, its evaluation, and the likelihood of its successful implementation
are discussed in some detail. The paper concludes with a call for
considerably more thought about what, hitherto, has been one of the
relatively uncontroversial aspects of many competition authorities'
activities.
I.

INTRODUCTION

By and large, the competition advocacy function of competition
authorities has not been a source of discord among the competition/antitrust
community. This stands in marked contrast to the competition law
enforcement function, where its application in specific cases has aroused
controversy. With respect to the former, discussions in the
competition/antitrust community often concern how to improve the
effectiveness of competition advocacy initiatives and, to that end, a number
of reports by national and international bodies have been published in
recent years that attempt to distill the principal lessons for policymakers.
The purpose of this article is to take a hard look at what competition
advocacy is, the means used to evaluate this function of competition
authorities, and the likelihood of related activities being implemented
successfully. The approach taken here does not reflect any antipathy by the
* Professor of International Trade and Economic Development, Swiss Institute of International Economics and Applied Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of
St. Gallen. Mailing address: SIAW-HSG, Bodanstrasse 8, 9000 St. Gallen, Switzerland.
Email: simon.evenett@unisg.ch. Telephone number: +41-71-224-2315. Fax: +41-71-2242298. For further information, see http://www.evenett.com. The author thanks Robert
Anderson and Steve Ryan for their comments on a presentation on this subject in October
2005. It should be stressed that these gentlemen probably do not share the views expressed
here, and they should not be implicated in any way. Comments and suggestions concerning
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author towards competition advocacy, or competition law and policy more
generally. The critical stance reflects a desire to understand competition
advocacy as best as possible, so that appropriate lessons can be drawn for
policymakers, officials, and other interested parties. The need for
appropriate policy advice in this area is pressing, precisely because there is
a presumption in some of the existing reports on competition advocacy that
this activity should be prioritized over the enforcement of competition law
in developing countries.
Section II of this paper closely examines the definition of competition
advocacy and states a number of its implications. Section III considers the
appropriate criteria for evaluating competition advocacy and looks at some
of the metrics employed in the existing literature. Section IV contains a
discussion of the likely success of competition advocacy initiatives and
relates this discussion to a prominent theory concerning the factors that
influence the regulatory process. Section V includes concluding remarks
and a discussion of some implications for policymaking and future analysis.
II. THE DEFINITION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF COMPETITION
ADVOCACY
The material in this section is organized into two parts. The first part
includes an overview of competition advocacy, drawing in particular on the
reports published in recent years by leading international bodies. The
second part contains a discussion of a prominent definition of competition
advocacy and identifies a number of non-trivial policy choices that are
raised by it and by competition advocacy more generally.
A. The Central Elements of Competition Advocacy
Although one can find earlier definitions of competition advocacy, the
definition advanced by the Advocacy Working Group of the International
Competition Network ("ICN") in a 2002 report has gained considerable
currency in the competition/antitrust community ("ICN (2002)"). The ICN
defines competition advocacy as "activities conducted by the competition
authority related to the promotion of a competitive environment for
economic activities by means of non-enforcement mechanisms, mainly
through its relationships with other governmental entities and by increasing
public awareness to the benefits of competition."' This definition refers to
both the ends and means of competition advocacy. In fact ICN (2002)
explained that there are two parts to the definition: the first part "refers to
practically all activities of the competition authority that do not fall under

1 Advocacy and Competition Policy, REP. OF THE ADVOC. WORKING GROUP, Int'l Competition Network, Naples, Italy, at i (2002), http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/
advocacyfinal.pdf [hereinafter ICN 2002].

Competition Advocacy: Time ForA Rethink?
26:495 (2006)
the enforcement category" 2 and the second part identifies to whom
competition advocacy is typically directed and for what purpose. As far as
the latter part is concerned, some advocacy is directed towards other public
bodies that regulate the economy and some towards society, which
ultimately benefits from greater inter-firm rivalry.
A large number of activities have been classified as forms of
competition advocacy. In 2004, the ICN noted that these activities include
performing reviews of existing and proposed laws and regulations;
providing advice on state measures that might foster anti-competitive
practices and associated resource misallocation; conducting outreach
activities to educate the public directly, through the holding of seminars and
the publication of newsletters, or indirectly through the media; informing
judges and legislators about competition policy-related matters; and
undertaking studies
3 of actual or potential state measures that may influence
market outcomes.
The objectives of competition advocacy, a competition authority's
duties in this regard, and the procedures to be followed by a competition
authority and other state bodies, can be codified in law. A competition
authority may have the legal right to be consulted at a certain point in time
on proposals by state bodies to change the manner in which the economy is
regulated. Moreover, the manner in which other state bodies respond to the
advice proffered by the competition authority in the conduct of its
competition advocacy function can be enshrined in law. Finally,
representatives of the competition authority, typically the head or its
designee, can be given the right to sit on other government bodies on terms
established in law including, in principle, the cabinet of a government or
other senior decision-making governmental forum. Countries differ
markedly in the extent to which legislation defines the ends and means of
the competition advocacy functions of competition authorities.
Furthermore, nothing in the above definition suggests that this function
need be enshrined in legislation, even though it is in some jurisdictions.
Three rationales for undertaking competition advocacy are advanced in
ICN (2002) and relate principally to the regulation-related "target" of
advocacy identified above.4 The first rationale offered is that public
intervention in an economy can hinder inter-firm rivalry, for example when
a government agency specifies the prices to be charged by taxis in a certain

2 id.

3 Competition Advocacy in Regulated Sectors: Examples of Success, REP. OF THE

Int'l
Competition
Network,
Seoul,
Korea,
at
47-48
(2004),
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/capacitybuild-sg4-seoul.pdf [hereinafter ICN
CAPACITY BUILDING AND COMPETITION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION WORKING GROUP,

2004].
4 ICN 2002, supra note 1.
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geographic area (such as within the limits of a city). It is often argued that
competition authorities should complement their enforcement activities
against private sector threats to competition arising from the ordinary
course of commerce with measures to eliminate, revise, or limit the harm
done by government regulations and other forms of state intervention to the
economy.5
The second rationale, which is related to the first but is nevertheless
distinct, is that competition advocacy by the competition authority to some
extent counters the influence of groups that seek the implementation of state
measures which advance their own interests. 6 Competition advocacy, then,
is concerned with both existing state intervention and possible future
interventions. It has been argued that here the competition authority acts on
behalf of those other groups in society for whom the costs of organization
are so large, or the costs of informing themselves so high, as to offer
effective opposition to proposals that will favor the proponents' economic
interests at the expense of the competitive process. 7
The third rationale in ICN (2002) is that, to the extent that competition
advocacy prevents implementation of anti-competitive regulations,
competition advocacy can discourage lobbying by private interests in the
first place. This, in turn, is said to have two benefits: reducing the amount
of societal resources that are "wasted" in such lobbying and reducing the
likelihood of regulatory capture, whereby private entities align the interests
8
of a regulator with their own.
Competition advocacy is said to be particularly important for
developing countries. Interestingly, the reports of the ICN's Advocacy
Working Group appear to have become firmer on this matter over time. The
report issued by this Group in 2002 noted that "it has often been argued that
in transition and developing countries, competition authorities should give
priority to advocacy over enforcement actions." 9 The report issued in 2004
by this Group drops the qualifier "it has often been argued that" and offers
three reasons for prioritizing competition advocacy. These reasons are:
First, in developing and transition countries, the spread of market reform
has given rise to an intensive rule making process. Dialogue between the

competition authority and other rule makers at an early stage may ensure
that competition provides the foundation for legislation. Second,
5
6 Id. at ii.

id.

7 James C. Cooper, Paul A. Pautler & Todd J. Zywicki, Theory andPracticeof Competi-

tion Advocacy at the FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091 (2005) (advancing such an argument
couched in terms of the so-called economic theory of regulation, as described in greater detail in Section IV of this paper).
8 ICN 2002, supra note 1, at ii.
IId. at iii.
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liberalization has also heightened the activity of interest groups as they
lobby for lost privileges. Competition authorities are considered to be
less prone to regulatory capture by interest groups than, for example,
sector-specific regulators and through advocacy competition authorities
can instill competitive values in sector-specific regulation, reducing the
possibility of regulatory capture. Third, law enforcement requires
sophisticated adjudication of competition cases which young
competition authorities and judicial systems often find challenging. 10
Such statements are significant because they provide clear advice not
just to engage in competition advocacy but to assign greater relevance to
this function of a competition authority over another function, namely
enforcement. Interestingly, in its Peer Review of the Chilean competition
authority, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") concluded that "[f]or developing countries without well
established competition regimes, promoting competition principles to the
general public is an ongoing task, indeed perhaps the most important task,
at least at first."' 1 This OECD statement can be read as going further than
the one by the ICN, as the former identifies one type of competition
advocacy as deserving of priority. In fairness, it should be noted that giving
priority to a particular state act does not necessarily imply undertaking that
act to the exclusion of other state acts, such as the enforcement of
competition law.
Over time the body of information on competition advocacy has grown3
12
with the writings of scholars, the publications of competition authorities,
and by international bodies and organizations.' 4 A particularly informative
source is a report prepared by the ICN after it conducted a survey of the
competition advocacy activities of its member competition authorities in
March 2002. Fifty-three competition authorities from fifty jurisdictions
responded to a survey instrument that contained forty-four questions.
The main findings of this survey were: (1) a clear majority of survey
respondents felt that competition advocacy had an important role in
addressing state-imposed or state-condoned constraints on competition; (2)
"autonomy" of the competition authority was "generally considered" to be a
10 ICN 2004, supra note 3, at 48.
11Terry Winslow, Competition Law and Policy in Chile, A PEER REV. 56 (2004),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/60/34823239.pdf.
12 See, e.g., William Kovacic, Getting Started: CreatingNew Competition Policy Institutions in Transition Economies, 23 BROOK. J.INT'L L. 403 (1997); Cooper, supra note 7, at
11-21.
13 See, e.g., Competition Council, Romania, Road Map for Competition Advocacy, at 1328 (June 2004), http://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/pdf/foaieparcurs.pdf.
14See, e.g., ICN 2002, supra note 1, at 23-101; ICN 2004, supra note 3, at 47-76; Competition Advocacy: Challengesfor Developing Countries, SECRETARIAT NOTE 3-9 (2004),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/42/32033710.pdf.
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determinant of effective competition advocacy, especially as that autonomy
relates to the appointment, renewal, and dismissal of senior officials of the
competition authority and to the process by which the authority's budget is
set; (3) participation, especially at an early stage, by the competition
authority in legislative and regulatory decision-making is "the most
important component of competition advocacy;" (4) transparency enhances
the effectiveness of competition advocacy by building public support, as
does the perception of the credibility and public neutrality of the
competition authority; (5) developing and industrialized countries differ in
their public-facing communication strategies, with the latter using more
targeted approaches and publicizing and undertaking special studies and the
former employing the mass media; (6) other than the last point, few other
material differences could be identified from the survey responses of
developing and industrialized countries; (7) additional resources would
allow competition authorities to undertake more effective competition
advocacy and authorities in developing countries said they needed more
expertise about regulated sectors; and (8) clear objectives should be set for
international cooperation and technical assistance on competition
advocacy. 15
In sum, a fairly comprehensive body of knowledge has developed
concerning the various aspects of competition advocacy. The arguments
made in the sections that follow will draw on this material.
B. Commentary on the Definition of Competition Advocacy
This subsection discusses various aspects of the definition of
competition advocacy. The purpose here is not to be critical per se, but to
identify a number of important assumptions and policy choices underlying
the well-known definition of competition advocacy advanced by the ICN. It
is hoped that this discussion will allow for more informed decision-making,
especially, as noted above, because competition advocacy is thought to be a
priority for developing countries.
The first point to be made is that the ICN's definition identifies
competition advocacy with competition authorities. This may seem rather
obvious, but nevertheless it is worth asking why a state should give the
function of competition advocacy to a competition authority. What are the
advantages of bundling the functions of enforcing competition law and
competition advocacy? A related question is what is the comparative
advantage of a competition authority in conducting competition advocacy
over other governmental and non-governmental actors? The latter question
is relevant, especially as the ICN's definition does not rule out others from
conducting competition advocacy.

15 ICN 2002, supra note 1, at xiii-xiv.
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There may well be very good answers to these two questions. For
instance, the expertise that a competition authority develops to enforce
competition law may be usefully applied in analyzing existing or future
potential regulations. The competition authority may have access to better
data than that available to any private non-governmental organization or
researcher, but as other state bodies may have comparable access to such
data there are limits here to this particular advantage of competition
authorities. Another advantage of competition authorities over non-state
providers of competition advocacy is that the latter may have objectives
other than promoting competition and this factor alone may color the
latter's analyses and policy recommendations.
The significance of these two questions is that, arguably, the design of
a new competition advocacy function should take into account existing
forms of competition advocacy or other potential sources of competition
advocacy. Ideally, the competition advocacy function given to a
competition authority should reinforce, and even exploit complementarities
with other parties that promote pro-competitive regulation, such as nongovernmental organizations and independent commentators (some of whom
may appear in the national media), rather than displace effective
alternatives.
Even in a country, perhaps a developing country, where initially there
are no existing advocates of pro-competitive regulation, the question still
arises as to whom the state should allocate the function of competition
advocacy. Should the function be given to a new commission, perhaps
linked to the government's economics or development ministry or to the
legislature, to the competition authority, or should public resources be used
to foster non-state commentary on actual or potential state regulations of
economic activity? As far as the latter alternative is concerned, one option
would be to give a committee of expert persons, who are not members of
the government, the authority and budget to engage in competition
advocacy. In short, when it comes to allocating the competition advocacy
function, governments have many choices available to them and
competition authorities ought to have compelling reasons as to why that
function should be given to them and not to some other party.
The possibility that there could be multiple providers of competition
advocacy raises other questions. How should a competition authority with
an advocacy function take advantage of a situation where others are
engaged in competition advocacy too? Is there an obvious division of labor
on competition advocacy between different providers, where specialization
is driven by respective comparative advantages or by any legal restrictions
on the activities undertaken by each supplier of such advocacy? Since
advocacy often follows analysis, what happens if two or more providers of
competition advocacy disagree in their policy recommendations, or disagree
with the competition authority's recommendation on the matter at hand?
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How does a competition authority "win" a competition for policy advice,
bearing in mind that the "market place" for ideas is often very different for
commercially traded goods and services? These questions are relevant not
only to the actual or potential providers of competition advocacy, such as a
competition authority, but also to the governments and legislatures which
are designing competition policies and deciding how much to fund different
pro-competition initiatives.
The next set of matters raised by the ICN's definition of competition
advocacy concerns the objective of this function, namely, "the promotion of
a competitive environment for economic activities."1 6 It should be noted
immediately that this objective does not constitute an endorsement of farreaching deregulation. In fairness to many authors on competition
advocacy, the distinction is made between regulation per se, which may be
motivated by non-efficiency considerations, and the potentially anticompetitive effects of regulation. The replacement (or avoidance) of
regulations with larger anti-competitive effects by those state measures with
less adverse consequences is said to be one operational way of interpreting
the objective of competition advocacy.
The ICN's definition, alas, does not say which state measures fall
under the scrutiny of competition advocacy. Presumably state regulatory
decisions not to act can fall within the realm of competition advocacy as
can decisions to impose regulatory measures, the former sometimes
affecting market outcomes as well. This implies that, in some
circumstances, competition authorities ought to be prepared to advocate the
implementation of state intervention in those markets where sub-optimal
outcomes are being generated by factors unrelated to other forms of state
intervention or to the nature of inter-firm rivalry. (Natural monopolies may
well be a relevant example here). This further emphasizes the point that
competition advocacy does not amount to blanket calls to either deregulate
or promote a laissez-faire approach.
The question does arise, however, as to what promoting a competitive
environment means. For example, does this term mean the promotion of
inter-firm rivalry, the entry of new firms, or the ability to enter a new
market? If the real goal is to promote entry and therefore to add to the
number of competitors, then competition advocacy would result in
recommendations to lower entry barriers and to pay subsidies to firms that
enter designated markets. However, the term "competitive environment"
seems to suggest that the state measures are broader than those that promote
entry into markets.
The term "competitive environment" is imprecise and does not provide
a sound basis upon which to compare the effects of different possible
16 Id. at ii.
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regulations of economic activity. One possibility that would be consistent
with much of the discussions of competition advocacy in the ICN's
publications and elsewhere, is to interpret this objective to mean the
promotion of regulations that improve, and optimize, the allocation of
resources as understood by micro-economists. That is, to increase (and
ideally to maximize) the sum of measures of producer and consumer
welfare. Seen in this light, there is both a metric and a set of wellestablished analytical tools that can be used to assess and implement
competition advocacy. This is not to say that the application of those tools
will always lead to the same policy recommendations (recall President
Truman's complaints about two-handed economists) and this approach
should probably not be seen as a panacea.
If the overall goal of competition advocacy is to promote better
resource allocation, or economic efficiency, as it is commonly known, then
others matters arise. Perhaps the most important of these matters is that the
goal of competition advocacy may well differ from that of the country's
competition law or economic policy in general. For sure, these goals could
be the same, but what happens if they are not? If, as is the case in many
developing and industrialized countries, the promotion of exports of smalland medium-sized enterprises are goals of national competition law, do
these goals or that of promoting economic efficiency take priority in the
conduct of competition advocacy? More generally, to what extent should
any non-efficiency objectives of national competition law be factored into
the conduct of competition advocacy?
Many of the apparent conflicts between goals can be resolved by
noting that competition advocacy seeks the implementation of the least
distorting form of government intervention to attain any given nonefficiency objective. A different way of looking at this matter is to argue
that a competition advocacy function, which promotes the least
distortionary form of government intervention, is all the more necessary
when governments consciously depart from efficient market outcomes so as
to attain any non-economic objectives of national competition law and, for
that matter, any such objectives in other national laws bearing on economic
activity.
One consequence of adopting a micro-economic perspective on
competition advocacy is that it involves taking on board clear
recommendations concerning how governments should best redistribute
national income. Micro-economic analyses, in particular those that are
based on perfectly competitive market structures, have created a strong
presumption in favor of using lump sum taxes and subsidies to redistribute
income across groups in society and avoiding state measures that7
deliberately alter prices in a manner that favors one group over another.'
17 See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFIELD, MICROECONOMICS 287-320
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Thus, from this microeconomic perspective, a government would be
advised to eliminate rent controls which benefit renters, some of whom may
have lower incomes, and replace them18 with direct payments to those renters
deemed to have insufficient incomes.
While this policy recommendation seems straightforward enough, two
related matters are worth bearing in mind. First, the informational
requirements and implementation costs of using taxes and subsidies to
redistribute income may be greater than those necessary to implement the
original regulation, and these factors should be taken into account (along
with others, including the potential for resource misallocation) when
formulating policy recommendations. Second, it should not be assumed that
every government has the capacity to transfer income using lump sum taxes
and subsidies, in which case the only way to attain a state's particular
distributional objectives may well be to control prices or to intervene in
certain markets. Given the weak nature of taxation and expenditure systems
in some developing countries, in particular in the fifty or so least developed
countries, the proper identification of the least distortionary form of
government intervention to attain a specified non-efficiency-related goal
need not result in the same policy recommendation for all countries.
The third comment on the ICN's definition of competition advocacy
concerns the scope of this particular function. While this definition is quite
clear about the government entities that could, in principle, receive
competition advocacy, nothing is said about the sectoral coverage of this
function. The definition certainly does not provide any guidance as to
which entities, policies, and sectors could or should be excluded from
competition advocacy, even though a state can decide which matters fall
within the mandate of those charged with implementing this function. On
this point, however, it is difficult to find suggestions in the extant literature
to limit the scope of competition advocacy.
An interesting and related matter is whether the sectoral scope of
competition advocacy and the corresponding sectoral scope of a
competition authority's enforcement powers are the same. As is well
known, for better or for worse, sectoral exemptions from competition law
are common in jurisdictions at every level of development. This raises the
logical possibility that the sectoral coverage of competition advocacy could
be broader than the sectoral coverage of the enforcement-related aspects of
national competition law. When such differences in sectoral coverage exist,
presumably this has implications for discussions on the substitutability and
complementarity of competition advocacy and enforcement. Perhaps more
importantly, the government entities covered by competition law and
enforcement and competition advocacy must surely differ, not least because
(6th ed. 2004).
18 id.
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the judiciary itself is unlikely to be the object of enforcement of
competition law! In terms of entities and sectors covered then, competition
advocacy can be broader in scope than competition enforcement, but
nothing prevents a government or legislature from designing the former so
that its scope is narrower than the latter.
For policymakers that are designing a competition advocacy function,
the scope of this function also raises questions as to what, if anything, the
recipients of competition advocacy should do with the advice that they
receive. This is particularly important for government ministries, sectoral
regulators, sub-national governments, and even private entities that have
state mandates. At a minimum, care must be taken to ensure that
competition advocacy does not result in a competition authority providing
advice that is tantamount to recommending that the other party break the
law. This will require the legislation governing these public parties'
activities to state that the effect on competition, or the opinions of the
competition authority, must be taken into account when designing
regulations and associated policies. Without such legal provisions some
recipients of competition advocacy may argue that the competition
authority is asking them to take into account factors that are not in the
recipients' legal mandates. For already-established regulators and state
bodies this may require a change in legislation of their mandates at the time
the competition advocacy function is created. Failure to take these
additional legal steps may, in practice, considerably narrow the scope of the
competition advocacy function than originally envisaged in the legislation
creating that function.
The ICN's definition of competition advocacy places all of the
emphasis on the advice and public awareness activities of a competition
authority and, therefore, not on the recipients of that advice. Perhaps it
would be better to think of a system of competition advocacy with suppliers
and recipients of advice, than to characterize competition advocacy in terms
of the activities of one particular government agency, namely, the
competition authority.
To the extent that the activities of a government's foreign, trade, and
transport ministries fall within the scope of competition advocacy, then the
competition authority may well believe it has the right to comment on the
influence of foreign regulations on market outcomes at home and on
international negotiations that have direct implications for domestic and
foreign regulation. This is not to say that competition authorities would or
should undertake negotiations with a foreign government but arguably the
negotiating mandates and any associated outcomes could well be the
subject of competition advocacy initiatives. Governments and legislatures
may want to take this into account when designing a competition advocacy
function, as the government ministries concerned are unlikely to welcome
interventions from the competition authority on such matters. Moreover,
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given the relatively high status of foreign ministries (and sometimes trade
ministries) within governments, designers of a competition advocacy
function ought to consider what is the appropriate status to attach to the
providers of competition advocacy (here taken to be the senior officials of
the competition authority) if their advice is to be given a serious hearing.
This matter becomes more important as many competition authorities are
relatively recent creations and their officials may not be held in the same
regard as the heads of more established government offices.
The fourth set of comments on the ICN's definition of competition
advocacy refers to the means by which this function is to be executed.
Specifically, this definition states that competition advocacy is to be
implemented "by means of non-enforcement mechanisms.' '1 9 Presumably
this refers to the activities undertaken by the competition authority that are
not directly related to the same authority's legal mandate concerning the
investigation, prosecution, and in some cases, punishment of anticompetitive practices that private (and possibly public) entities are thought
to have engaged in. This is not a terribly helpful formulation as arguably
there are other non-enforcement functions that a competition authority can
undertake even if it is not attempting to raise awareness of the effects of
competition or trying to influence actual and proposed state regulations. For
example, surely some accountability-related activities of a competition
authority (whether it be directly to a legislature or indirectly through a
responsible minister) would be undertaken in the absence of a competition
advocacy function? In principle, competition authorities could be
accountable for their use of public funds, hiring decisions, enforcement
priorities (which may not relate to actual enforcement actions in cases), as
well as for enforcement-related decisions. In a sense, then, the ICN's
definition of competition advocacy is probably too broad.2 °
It would be wrong to infer from the ICN's definition of competition
advocacy that its proponents conceive of enforcement action and
competition advocacy as necessarily unrelated activities. As noted earlier,
however, it may be possible to identify sectors and entities where
competition advocacy is possible and enforcement action is not. Yet there
are numerous potential inter-relationships between competition advocacy
and the enforcement of competition law that policymakers ought to bear in
mind when designing a system of competition advocacy. For example, the
successful implementation of competition advocacy in a given market may
save considerable resources, should subsequent enforcement action become
unnecessary. Moreover, the information and expertise acquired during an
19ICN 2002, supra note 1.

20 Incidentally, none of this is to say that once an authority has a competition advocacy
function that this would not have implications for the manner in which a competition authority undertakes its accountability-related activities.

Competition Advocacy: Time For A Rethink?
26:495 (2006)

enforcement action may be fruitfully used in competition advocacy
activities. These examples highlight that there can be inter-temporal and
contemporaneous relationships between competition advocacy and
enforcement, and that each activity can sometimes substitute for and
sometimes complement the other.
In sum, the purpose of this discussion has been to identify a number of
fundamental matters that arise from one prominent definition of
competition advocacy. The matters raised here are arguably relevant to
other definitions of competition advocacy that were found while
researching for this article. Thus, this discussion should not be interpreted
as suggesting that the ICN definition is particularly flawed. Rather the goal
has been to identify the significant policy choices that underlie the decision
to adopt a competition advocacy function. The fact that there are many
options available to governments in this regard, and there exist differences
across countries in the options chosen, raises the question of how best to
evaluate national systems of competition advocacy, a topic that is discussed
in the next section of this article.
III. EVALUATING COMPETITION ADVOCACY
Developing better techniques to evaluate competition advocacy is
important for several reasons. First, public agencies, such as competition
authorities, are accountable to (typically elected) representatives for their
use of state resources and the powers entrusted to them, and the latter may
want evidence of the effectiveness of the former's activities. Those
representatives face a broad range of competing demands for societal
resources and may employ some metrics to assist them in allocating funds
and personnel across government functions. Similar remarks could be made
about bilateral donors and international organizations that support technical
assistance projects on different types of competition policy initiatives,
including nurturing competition advocacy. Second, many competition
authorities want to know what best practices can be established for
competition advocacy and this too requires a notion of what constitutes
success in competition advocacy and the formulas, so to speak, for success.
A third reason is that competition authorities have to decide how to
allocate scarce budgetary resources, personnel time, media exposure, and
other inputs across the enforcement and advocacy functions that it may
have recognizing, as noted earlier, the interconnections between these
functions. In a similar vein, an evaluation of the returns on resources
invested in competition advocacy and in enforcement should shed light on
the wisdom of the advice given to developing countries to prioritize
competition advocacy. A fourth reason is that competition authorities may
want to establish priorities over the different types of competition advocacy
that they can perform, recognizing that the payoffs from different types may

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

26:495 (2006)

not be the same. Finally, from a societal viewpoint there could be interest in
how well competition authorities perform competition advocacy compared
to other providers of competition advocacy, be they state bodies (such as
legislative watchdogs and committees) or private initiatives.
Making the case for evaluating competition advocacy turns out to be a
lot easier than conducting such evaluations properly. To date, published
evaluations have taken the form of assessments by competition authorities
of their own advocacy activities, survey questionnaires that seek to establish
general impressions as to what factors impede or facilitate the successful
implementation of competition advocacy, and accounts of individual
competition advocacy initiatives, with typically binary evaluations of how
successful a given initiative was. These evaluation methods have been
principally qualitative in nature, with the competition authorities themselves
often choosing both whether to participate in any particular evaluation and
what examples of competition advocacy to highlight.
Without seeming to dismiss qualitative evidence, which itself can be
very useful, it is a concern that the class of quantitative event studies that
have been performed on competition enforcement actions have not yet been
conducted on competition advocacy initiatives. This unfortunate outcome
probably reflects the fact that conducting such empirical evaluations is
difficult, as the example in the next paragraph will demonstrate. Even so,
the paucity of empirical estimates suggests that some attempts at
quantification, however imperfect, are needed. At the very least, they might
stimulate further attempts at quantification and refinements in the
methodologies employed.
Suppose, for example, that a certain advocacy initiative was
"successful" in that it prevented an anti-competitive regulation from being
imposed. Here, one might want to quantify the welfare losses that were
avoided and argue that these losses constitute the benefit from undertaking
this competition advocacy initiative. One difficulty with this line of
reasoning, however, is that it may be inappropriate to attribute the decision
not to implement the regulation solely to the competition advocacy of the
competition authority. Other types of advocacy may have been influential
too. Moreover, it may be inappropriate to assume that in the absence of the
initiative by the competition authority, the anti-competitive regulation
would have been imposed in its initially proposed form. Other parties that
seek to promote competition could well have been successful in altering the
proposal so as to limit its anti-competitive effect. Here, defining the
counterfactual is very difficult and, implicitly or explicitly, requires making
assumptions about how ideas, information, private sector influence, and
competing groups influence regulatory outcomes. Put differently, most
evaluations of competition advocacy contain implicit assumptions about the
workings of the regulatory process, assumptions which may be inconsistent,
irrelevant, or open to challenge. Quantitative evaluations are no different
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from qualitative evaluations in this respect.
Matters are not much better when it comes to evaluating the
determinants of the public's awareness of the benefits of competition and
the potential contribution of the competition authority in this regard. There
are, for sure, some intermediate indicators that might be useful here, such as
the percentage of the population (or legislature or judiciary) who are aware
of the role of the competition authority, and its outreach activities, and the
percentage that find the competition authority's "message" compelling.
Moreover, surveys of general attitudes towards pro-competitive reforms
could, if carefully interpreted, reveal something about the effectiveness of
competition advocacy initiatives. However, it would be important in this
case to strip out any changes in public attitudes towards reforms that were
caused by other factors, such as perceptions of current and prior macroeconomic performance. Even if this were accomplished, it is difficult to put
a number on the value of a perhaps five percent swing in public support
behind promoting competition.
In sum, of the five rationales mentioned above for evaluating
competition advocacy, a comprehensive approach to implementing all but
the second requires some type of quantitative evidence on the impact of
competition advocacy measures. At present, much evidence of this nature is
not available. Should this situation remain, the competition advocacy
function itself could become vulnerable to attack on the value-for-money
grounds from both the very private interests that advocacy seeks to counter
and from those government officials who would like the resources given to
competition advocacy to be allocated to some other activity.
Where lessons have been learned, they have tended to relate to best
practices for the organization and for competition advocacy. 2' The most
important lessons are institutional in nature and would in most jurisdictions
almost certainly require legislation to implement, rather than strategies or
tactics that could be employed under existing institutional arrangements.2 2
If true, these lessons create a premium on putting the appropriate legal
structures in place for effective competition advocacy, including probably
the revision of existing competition and regulatory statutes. Competition
authorities that adopt competition advocacy functions on their own volition
may find their effectiveness in advocacy compromised by an inadequate set
of legal and institutional arrangements. Moreover, weak competition
authorities may be reluctant to seek legislative changes (that would, on the
above advice, increase the expected effectiveness of competition advocacy)
because they may fear that their authority's other powers and prerogatives
may be eroded when the matter comes before the legislature. The last two
examples identify circumstances why sub-optimal competition advocacy
21
22

See ICN 2002, supra note 1; ICN 2004, supra note 3; supra Section II.
See ICN 2002, supra note 1, at xiii-xiv.
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may persist in some countries,
In many respects the evaluation of competition advocacy is in its
infancy, with some qualitative evidence to guide policymaking. Useful
quantitative evidence is almost non-existent. In light of the available
evidence, one question that arises is whether the policy recommendation
that developing countries prioritize competition advocacy over enforcement
has the necessary empirical support.
IV. COMPETITION ADVOCACY AND THE ECONOMIC THEORY
OF REGULATION
The previous section drew upon the experience of competition
authorities to identify potential best practices for the organization and
conduct of competition advocacy. This is not the only source of information
on regulatory processes. These processes have been studied for decades and
it would be worth asking what the insights of leading schools of thought on
regulation and regulatory change imply about the likely success of
competition advocacy and the preconditions for such success. This line of
inquiry may lead to an alternative set of perspectives on competition
advocacy and policy recommendations.
Until the 1960s, in the United States at least, the leading theory of
economic regulation and regulatory change emphasized that market failure
was the rationale for regulation and that state entities, sometimes guided by
in-house and external experts, would introduce regulation to eliminate, or at
least reduce, resource misallocation in markets and associated
inefficiencies.23 Moreover, on this view, regulations would be amended as
underlying market conditions changed, with the same goal in mind. This
market failure-based theory, therefore, explained not only why regulations
were needed in principle but also how they were implemented in practice.
Efficiency considerations were central.24 What does this theory imply about
the need for and likely success of competition advocacy? To the extent that
the regumlntnrv nrn.cs is guided by cnrrectingr mnrlkt failure
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improving the allocation of resources, there would be little need for one
type of competition advocacy. Here, regulators would follow precisely the
same objective that motivates competition advocacy and so would
implement the least distortive form of regulation. However, as this theory is
silent on whether the public needs to be educated about the benefits of
competition, then one cannot rule out the need for the awareness-raising
component of competition policy.
The market failure-based theories of regulation began to lose currency
23 Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation,
1989 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, MICROECONOMICS 1 (1989) (providing an
overview of this aspect of the literature on regulation and subsequent developments).
24 Id. at 4-5.

Competition Advocacy: Time ForA Rethink?

26:495 (2006)
in the 1970's as more scholars questioned their ability to account for the
pattern of regulation observed in the American economy. The seminal
analysis of George Stigler on the factors accounting for the supply and
demand for regulation was emphasized with greater force. 5 This and other
explanations, collectively known as the economic theory of regulation,
sought to explain the pattern of actual regulation by considering the motives
of politicians to supply regulation (in return for various forms of
electorally-valuable support) and the demand for regulation by interest
groups (that have both the resources to organize and acquire the information
necessary to influence political decision-making).2 6 Pursuant to this theory,
politicians are treated like other agents in microeconomic analyses, that is,
as self-interested persons who take actions that maximize their own wellbeing. Since politicians either legislate regulation, or create the agencies
that implement regulation, state intervention in markets is no longer driven
purely by efficiency considerations. Sam Peltzman provides the following
straightforward list of predictions concerning the characteristics of
regulation that can be found in the literature on the economic theory of
regulation:
" Compact, well-organized groups will tend to benefit more from regulation
than broad, diffuse groups. This probably creates a bias in favor of producer
groups, because they are usually well organized relative to all consumers...
" Regulatory policy will seek to preserve a politically optimal distribution of
rents across this coalition [of influential interest groups]. Thus, over time,
the policy will tend to offset changes in this optimal distribution arising
from shifts in demand or cost conditions...
" Because of the political payoff to regulation arising from distributing
wealth, the regulatory process is sensitive to deadweight losses. Policies
that reduce the total wealth available for distribution will be avoided,
because, other things being equal, they reduce the political payoff from
regulation. 7
In the light of these findings, what does the economic theory of regulation
imply about the rationale and likely success of competition advocacy?
Some scholars have argued that this theory provides a compelling
rationale for allocating a competition advocacy function to a state body.2°
The dispersed losses from actual or proposed regulations imply that those
often hurt by such government measures may not have the incentive to bear
25 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF EcoN & MGMT.
Sci. 3, 3-21 (1971).
26 Peltzrnan, supra note 23, at 5-14.
27 Id. at 13.
28 See Cooper, supra note 7.
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the informational and organizational costs to oppose those producer interest
groups who support the imposition of these measures. The latter groups
tend to be smaller in number, making their collective action less costly to
organize and ensuring that typically any benefits of regulation are spread
over a limited number of beneficiaries. In these circumstances, James C.
Cooper, Paul A. Pautler, and Todd J. Zywicki argue that "it is useful to
identify a public entity tasked with the responsibility of representing
dispersed consumers and competitors as an end in itself in the political
process. '29 What would a competition authority do here? According to
Cooper, Pautler, and Zywicki, the authority would use its understanding of
market forces to explain to the public and to politicians whether any
proposed regulations are, in fact, in the public good, as their proponents
often claim.30
These same authors also recognize, however, that
competition authorities can only provide information and not votes,
campaign contributions, or other electoral benefits, which are what
politicians are thought to value in this framework.31 In short, the
effectiveness of competition advocacy will, on this view, turn on the
relative strength of information and ideas as compared to private interests.
It would seem, therefore, that although this line of reasoning provides a
rationale for establishing a competition advocacy function, it does not offer
assurances that competition advocacy will generally be successful.
Further consideration of the economic theory of regulation provides
other doubts about the potential success of competition advocacy. To see
this, some elaboration of one aspect of this theory is needed first. This
theory has been used to study the factors that determine the degree of
regulation (or state intervention) across sectors. 32 Gary Becker provided an
elegant treatment of what happens when private producer interests from
different industries offer inducements to self-interested politicians to award
them benefits or to cushion them from economic Costs. 33 Gary Becker
showed that although inefficient regulatory policies may well result from
this process, there is an in-built constraint on the degree of inefficiency.34
Politicians who seek electorally-valuabie support from interest groups know
that regulatory policies that are inefficient reduce the total willingness of
those groups to pay for state intervention. On this view, politicians have an
incentive to find ways to satisfy the demand for privileges that minimize the

29 Cooper, supra note 7, at 6.
30 id.

"' Id. at 7-8.
32 Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groupsfor PoliticalInfluence,
98

Q. J. ECON. 370, 370-400 (1983).
33 Id.
34id.
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overall reduction in the size of the economic pie.35
What does this perspective suggest about the likely effects of
competition advocacy? On the whole, the writings about competition
advocacy tend to refer to opposition by a competition authority to a single
regulatory measure. Moreover, there is a presumption that policymakers or
designated officials choose regulations without regard to the inefficiencies
that those regulations create. Becker's seminal analysis suggests that, to the
contrary, politicians are well aware of the losses created by inefficient
regulations and that they choose those regulations which minimize the
degree of inefficiency while delivering a certain level of favors to producer
interests.3 6 There is, then, already a built in constraint on the regulatory
process and not because politicians are benign but because their ability to
37
extract forms of electoral support are reduced by inefficient regulation.
One implication of this logic is that a "successful" initiative of competition
advocacy may reduce the inefficiency in a given sector's regulations, but if
politicians still find it optimal to maintain the original supply of privileges
then the net effect of competition advocacy will be to displace one form of
anti-competitive regulation for another. Moreover, the newly implemented
form of regulation may be more inefficient than the regulation that it
replaced, an outcome that is likely if, as Becker shows, politicians chose the
original set of regulatory inventions38 to minimize the total degree of
distortion to markets in the first place.
The economic theory of regulation represents the most widelyaccepted body of research concerning the determinants and consequences of
regulatory processes. The fact that competition advocacy has not been
successfully reconciled with the tenets and findings of this theory is, to put
it mildly, disturbing for the following reason: proponents of competition
advocacy tend to rely on economic assumptions and tools to show that
many forms of government intervention distort market outcomes. Yet,
application of the same economic framework to the study of regulatory
processes calls into question the need for certain types of competition
advocacy, its likelihood of success, and whether in fact it will actually
reduce the total amount of regulatory distortions in the economy. As a
matter of logic one can reject the economic theory of regulation without
rejecting the economic analysis of government intervention in markets.
However, the basis of that rejection should be spelled out. In other words,
an alternative explanation of the process by which regulations get made and
amended would have to be advanced, and its implications for competition
advocacy examined. Until such an alternative has been spelled out and until
31 Id. at 384-88.
36 Id. at 386.
37 Id.
38

Becker, supra note 32, at 386.
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it has gained sufficient currency among scholars of regulation, then some
doubt must exist over the conceptual rationale for competition advocacy.
V.

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Competition advocacy has acquired considerable prominence in
discussions in international fora, including at the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development and the International
Competition Network. There appears to be considerable agreement among
the competition/antitrust community that this function should be undertaken
by competition authorities. Some have gone further and argued that this
function should be the priority for competition authorities in developing
countries.
This paper takes a hard look at the definition of competition advocacy,
the rationales and means for evaluating competition advocacy, and the
relationship between competition advocacy and well-established scholarly
research on the regulatory process. The conventional wisdom on
competition advocacy was found to be wanting in a number of respects.
This is not to say that such wisdom is fatally flawed and consequently
readers should not conclude that competition advocacy should necessarily
be abandoned or that it is fundamentally misconceived. Rather,
considerably more thought is needed to better identify the forms of
successful competition advocacy, why such advocacy works, and the
benefits that flow from it. Without such developments, competition
advocacy will be vulnerable to attack on a number of grounds, including
whether it provides value-for-money. Since undertaking competition
advocacy often involves arguing against influential private sector interests,
competition authorities cannot expect much mercy from their critics in this
regard.
Turning to developing countries, one important implication of this
study is that the policy recommendation that they prioritize competition
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it successfully, is surely misplaced, or at least premature. There may come a
time when there is sufficient evidence to sustain such a policy
recommendation, but that time is some way off in the future.
Much more evidence on how countries can make the most of their
existing institutional structures for advancing competition advocacy is
needed, recognizing that many of those structures fall far short of the
recommendations found in recent international reports. Legislative change
may not be politically feasible in some countries, in which case those giving
advice should not make the perfect (legislative reforms) the enemy of the
good. Plus, it would be unwise to assume that the good is good enough,
given the other competing demands for resources in societies and the
effectiveness of other possible sources of competition advocacy.

